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Administrative Reform to Overcome Institutional Racism:   
Exploring Government’s Trust Building Tactics to Renew 
Relationships with Community-based Organizations   
 
 
Abstract:   
 
Institutional racism embedded in the existing public management practices has 
systematically created distrust between community-based organizations serving Black, 
Indigenous, and other people of color (BIPOC). However, little is known about how the 
government could reform public bureaucracies to renew their relationship with these 
important community-based organizations. Through a process-oriented inductive study of 
Minnesota’s 2-Generation Policy Network, we find that government’s intentional tactics 
both inside the bureaucracy and with BIPOC community-based organizations allowed them 
to create new collaborative infrastructure that both changed organizational routines and 
built power to address racial inequities in the existing human service system. This study 
documents the importance of public managers’ intentionality in addressing the historical 
legacy that is an outgrowth of conventional practice and assessing their own identities to 
assess and challenge the mechanism of traditional, bureaucratic authority. Trust between 
the government and BIPOC community-based organizations needs to be earned and rebuilt.  
 
 





            There is growing recognition that public organizations need to experience significant 
changes to respond to the “nervous area of government”: racial equity (Gooden, 2014). 
While these agencies evoke impressions of security, stability, and predictability, the trust in 
them is at an all-time low, particularly from Black, Indigenous, and other people of color 
(BIPOC) (Kettl, 2017). To implement any meaningful administrative reform and overcome 
institutional racism, it is imperative to regain trust from BIPOC communities. In fact, trust 
building between government agencies and BIPOC communities may be one of the most 
daunting public management challenges in the United States given the legacy of historical 
institutional racism (Stivers, 2007; Kendi, 2016). However, little attention has focused 
upon understanding the incremental ways that trust is built within administrative contexts 
with little collaborative capacity, where the history of racialized institutional distrust is 
apparent.  Yet this is the reality now facing many public bureaucracies grappling with both 
the neoliberalism legacies of new public management and the racial reckoning in the 
COVID-era.   
Beyond the normative impulse to advance racial equity, the need to address 
persistent inequities is clear in many policy domains including human services, which is 
the focus of this research.  In child welfare where the state has the authority to remove 
children from their parents and terminate parental rights, the over-representation of Black 
and American Indian children is well documented (Children’s Bureau, 2016; Wells, 2011), 
and racial biases exist at each decision points in the service continuum (Font, 2013; 
Putnam-Hornstein et al., 2013).  In early childhood education, there are significant racial 
disparities in the diagnosis of developmental and behavioral conditions, with white 
children much more likely to benefit from early detection that enables treatment (Morgan, 
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et al, 2016).  Additionally, racial disparities in almost every measure of educational 
attainment – including kindergarten readiness –persist over time (Reardon and Portilla, 
2016).   
In these human services policy fields, collaborative networks have long served as 
the institutional arrangement for service provision (Milward & Provan, 2003; Sandfort & 
Milward, 2008).  These networks depend upon contracts between state and non-
governmental actors to deliver public services and often state attention focuses upon 
negotiating principal-agent relationships one by one without considering the larger 
systemic consequences of the contracting regime (Smith, 2010).  Yet, the consequences of 
‘the system’ is widely understood by nonprofit organizations who struggle both with 
persistent underinvestment and contradictory performance criteria created by local, state, 
and national governments (Marwell & Calabrese, 2015).  These administrative 
arrangements are more likely to generate distrust instead of trusted partnerships in public 
services (Kettl, 2017; Salamon, 1995).  Furthermore, given structured racialization (Powell, 
2013), organizations serving BIPOC experience unique dynamics navigating engagement 
with public agencies (Barnes, 2020).   
In this study, we take advantage of a unique initiative focused upon trying to 
address these specific challenges, to build more durable, trusting relationships between a 
state government agency and community-based organizations with expertise serving 
BIPOC families.  Minnesota’s 2-Generation Policy Network is an attempt to collaboratively 
redesign systems, policies, and practices to address racial disparities through integrating 
health and human services.   Our in-depth, multi-method study provides a window into 
how trust is built at the early stages of such a collaborative governance initiative, 
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particularly one focused on overcoming the legacy of racial inequities that strains the 
relationship between government and community-based organizations serving BIPOC 
families.   
Through our inductive analysis we build a conceptual model that recognizes that 
while trust operates as a resource in public service collaborations, it must be purposively 
built through cascading administrative tactics, some of which are successful, others which 
are not.  Analytically, we considered a number of descriptive questions:  How did existing 
legacy public management practices and administrative rules strain the building of trust?  
What happened when these practices and rules were altered?  How did community 
partners respond initially and overtime?  In answering these questions, this research 
uncovers that for community-based organizations working with BIPOC communities, trust 
building begins with interpersonal relationships.  While there may be a goal of building 
institutional trust, this often requires alignment of formal mechanisms within the 
bureaucracy which take longer to change.   
By careful examination of micro-processes - the tactics and strategies undertaken by 
the state government to build trust and what resulted from the perspective of community-
based organizations - we seek to overcome a gap in the scholarly account of this social 
mechanism.  Our findings indicate that these efforts must start at the beginning.  Public 
administrators must consider the operation of their agencies, altering existing structures, 





Previous Research  
Trust is considered a key to the success of partnerships and it holds collaboration 
together (Bryson et al., 2006; Van Slyke, 2007).  It is often associated with increasing 
productivity, improving communication, lowering transaction costs, reducing stress, and 
enhancing problem-solving (Alexander & Nank, 2009).  Yet trust is often absent especially 
at the beginning stage of collaboration. What we are more likely to observe in collaboration 
is uncertainty among partners, conflicts, and the misuse of power (Purdy, 2012).  Between 
the crude reality in practice and normative proposition of trust in the literature, there are 
big gaps in our understanding of how collaborative partners can build and maintain trust 
over time (Huxham & Vangen, 2013; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Bardach, 1998; Klijn, 2010; 
Osborne, 2006). This gap of knowledge is particularly salient for public management as the 
existing contracting regime systematically marginalize BIPOC community-based 
organizations and distrust is likely to dominate these relationships.  
Ever since the New Public Management movement, service contracting has been a 
predominant practice of how local governments interact with community-based 
organizations, especially in human services (Fabricant & Fisher, 2002; Gazley & Brudney, 
2007; Salamon, 1995; Sandfort, 1999; Smith, 2010).  Despite its premises in 
complementing the insufficiencies of the public sector, scholars have questioned the 
effectiveness of the contracting regime in building a genuine relationship between the 
government and community-based organizations.   In fact, the existing contracting regime 
systematically marginalizes agencies serving BIPOC communities.  For one, there is a lack 
of competition in many service contracting practices both in the U.S. and around the world 
(Jing & Chen, 2012; Van Slyke, 2003). The lack of competition and requirements of 
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administrative infrastructures often marginalize community-based organizations that have 
expertise in serving particular communities in contrast to large service providers.  In the 
modern welfare state, governments often use universalistic criteria in selecting clients and 
make funding decisions (Lipsky & Smith, 1989; Gazley &Brudney, 2007).  As a result, 
community-based organizations service BIPOC may not be eligible to apply for many 
government contract and grant funding opportunities.  Recent research has shown that 
black legacy nonprofits (nonprofits founded before 1969 with a mission to serve the Black 
community) received nearly 50% less funding from government grants than other types of 
nonprofit organizations (Deng & Myers, 2019). The lack of government funding 
opportunities creates a vicious cycle of resource insufficiency that further compromises the 
administrative capacities of these organizations to go after other public funding 
opportunities.  
Additionally, the managerialism and professionalism values embedded in the 
contracting out processes systematically marginalize BIPOC community-based 
organizations (Heckler, 2019; Ray, 2019).  A nationwide survey of public health service 
providers supported by government contracts in New Zealand documented that 
community-based organizations serving indigenous communities were likely to have a 
shorter length of contracts, endure a higher intensity of monitoring,  bear more compliance 
costs and get audited more often, compared to more generic service providers (Came et al., 
2018).  It also is widely documented that delays in government payment and insufficient 
funding to cover the full costs of nonprofit service delivery are prevalent in the current 
contracting regime (Peng & Lu, 2020; Marwell & Calabrese, 2015).  Due to their lack of 
resources and limited networks, community-based organizations serving BIPOC are likely 
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to be disproportionally impacted by these malfunctions of the contracting processes 
compared to organizations serving white communities. The payment delays and 
insufficiencies cause stress and a lower level of trust in government perceived by these 
community-based organizations (Peng & Lu, 2020).   
               These systematic barriers marginalize community-based organizations serving 
BIPOC in the contracting regime.  That, combined with other experiences, creates 
conditions in which distrust is likely to dominate the relationship with government. Even 
with the genuine intentions to renew their relationships with these community-based 
organizations and address institutional racism, public managers need to break both 
structural barriers inside the bureaucracy and facilitate trust building with their 
community partners (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011).  
So how can the government rebuild trust with BIPOC community-based 
organizations?  Theories about trust-building are clear that trust is built over time. Vangen 
and Huxham (2003:8) propose a trust-building loop where trust is built incrementally, 
over time, in a “virtuous circle.”  In other words, trust-building activities feed off each other 
and accumulate over time, depending upon past experiences (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Mayer, 
et al 1995; Sandfort, 1999).  Trust is both an input and an output of collaboration.  In 
developing the practice theory of collaboration, Huxham (2003, p. 408) notes that “while 
the existence of trusting relationships between partners probably would be an ideal 
situation, the common practice appears to be that suspicion, rather than trust, between 
partners, is commonly the starting point.” 
In the rational choice tradition, trust is seen as an encapsulated interest, meaning 
that it depends upon one’s assessment of the objectives of the other party and the degree of 
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alignment (Hardin, 1992; 2002).  Distrust is a protective mechanism for the less powerful 
party to safeguard one’s own interest (Cook, Hardin & Levi, 2005; Lee & Dodge, 2019).  For 
trust to be developed, there must be incentive compatibility between the two parties.  In 
daily management practices, the key question is how each party can show the other that 
the incentive compatibility is true and genuine.  Scholars studying institutions and political 
economy call this key question to be resolved between the state and other parties as 
‘credible commitment’ (North, 1993; Ostrom, 1990). To bring other parties to the reform, 
the state needs to show credible commitment to overcome their institutional power and 
authority as other nongovernmental parties are always afraid that the government will 
overturn their decision even if the government wants to share power.    
Based on the theory of credible commitment, institutional arrangements and rules 
become crucial to set up the right incentives for collaboration.  There might also be 
legalistic remedies government agencies could put in place to convince the partners that 
they are genuine about the reform.  However, ultimately, community partners assess a key 
question - how trustworthy is the government?  Given the uncertain political environment 
and the high turnover of elected leaders, community partners in administrative reforms 
may never be 100% sure that the new rules are effective, especially when their past 
interactions with the government were dominated by historical inequities and the lack of 
voice (Heckler, 2019).  And research suggests that over-subscribing in legalistic remedies 
may hurt rather than help trust building (Das & Teng, 2001; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). This 
literature suggests that to initiate a collaborative initiative, public managers must also 
build interpersonal trust with BIPOC community-based organizations (Braihwaite, 2008, 
Lambright, Mischen & Laramee, 2010).  
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Research Setting and Policy Field 
The research context influences the activities undertaken by public managers and 
their intentions.  While Minnesota is often regarded as a state with strong quality of life 
indicators - high education levels, homeownership rates, and labor market participation – it 
is also a state where there are persistent and sizable racial disparities in almost all 
indicators of individual and community well-being (Tran & Treuhaft, 2014).   Termed “the 
Minnesota Paradox”, leaders in philanthropy, government, business and nonprofits actively 
pursued initiatives in the last decade that begin to address the legacy of white supremacy 
within institutions.   
In the administration of social welfare programs, the state government sets policy 
and the counties administer them through service partnerships with the state’s robust 
nonprofit sector.  In the mid-2010s, leaders recognized that white people were 
disproportionately represented in state agencies and undertook a purposive effort to hire 
differently.  In the Children & Families administration of the Department of Human 
Services (DHS), this resulted in more racially diverse program managers, promotions of 
Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC) into positions of authority, and greater value 
placed upon knowledge gleaned from working in community-based nonprofit 
organizations.  When there was an opportunity for the state to apply for a grant from the 
National Governor’s Association in 2016, these new leaders were excited by the potential of 
launching a “Minnesota 2-Generation Policy Network.” It focused upon the growing 
evidence that human service programs designed around the relationships between parents 
and children can improve long-term outcomes (Chase-Lansdale & Brooks-Gunn, 2014; 
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Sommer et al, 2016) and that existing structures, public policies and funding impede public 
investment in such programs (Agranoff, 2014; Hasset & Austin, 1997).  When selected to 
participate in the national project with four other states, the Director of Economic 
Assistance Division decided to use flexible public funds to invest in local service 
organizations interested in piloting “2-Gen” programs (Kutcher & Sandfort, 2018).  It was 
the only state in the national initiative to invest in local program innovation (Gaines et al., 
2019).   
This experience, as well as other initiatives attempting to understand the legacy of 
state action in communities disproportionately affected by inadequate child care and 
children’s removal from their parents, convinced state leaders that reform needed to focus 
on changing the nature of government-nonprofit relationships.  In early 2018, three DHS 
Directors began planning for a larger collaborative initiative working with local sites that 
had expertise serving racial communities that experience systemic inequities (Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015).  Their first action step was to commit to blending three distinct sources of 
public funding:  federal funds from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
and Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) targeted for innovation and quality 
enhancement;  and state funds earmarked for efforts to reduce racial disparities in child 
welfare programs. In the end, eight local organizations received five-year grants as part of 
the overall $22.5 million initiative (See Appendix One). 
There were several collaborative governance and racial equity principles articulated 
early in the operation of the initiative, such as the engagement of diverse stakeholders and 
the use of cross-sector problem-solving teams.  Also, the state was explicit about its 
interests in decentering traditional administrative power, through creating a ‘learning 
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network’ of diverse voices, stressing information and data from families was valued, and 
highlighting that cultural knowledge needed to inform the project.  The theory of change 
document share with grantees was clear – through this five-year public investment, the 
state wanted honest review and dialogue about system-level barriers in policy and 
practices that intervened in effective engagement of American Indian, Black and other 
families of color.   The first year focused upon the design to both deepen understanding of 
pressing issues in the community and create more holistic responses with stakeholders, 
with subsequent years supporting implement the projects and ongoing discussion about 
system barriers and administrative burdens.  In turn, the state government planned to take 
these lessons to support new administrative rules and state legislation, invest in the 
development of new tools and technologies, and work with federal and county 
governments to reduce barriers.  This vision was a significant alteration in public 
management practice and leaders asked the University of Minnesota’s Future Services 
Institute to provide programmatic and evaluation support.      
As is documented in the analysis that follows, these collaborative governance 
aspirations required the painstaking development of new public management 
infrastructure, one characterized by trust and transparency to support innovative program 
design to better meet the needs of BIPOC communities.  Existing state bureaucratic 
practices for communication, contracting, program enhancement and monitoring more 
often fueled distrust than the resources needed for collaboration.  This was felt both within 
state government, as the initiative required collaboration across programmatic 
departments, and in the relationship with the local nonprofit and governments designing 
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the program.  The initial progress created durability in the network that allowed it to 
survive and thrive in the months when the COVID pandemic changed all of the work.   
 
Data and Methodology 
This analysis draws upon a rich data set comprised of information from a number of 
sources.  First, in depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with both the local 
grantees in the initiative and public managers.  Grantee interviews occurred remotely, 
were audio-recorded and transcribed.  Interviews with public managers in the state’s 
human services agency included senior appointed officials, program directors, and key staff 
were conducted in person, audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  In total 18 
interviews were conducted between October 2019 and March 2020.   
Second, our data set included various agency documents, such as the formal 
statement of the theory of change, tools used to recruit potential grantees, and resources 
used to structure the grantee selection process.  In this document collection, we focused 
specifically on approximately fifty artifacts that operationalize agency practices such as 
requests for proposals, contracting and monitoring tools.  Third, participant observation 
notes were collected by Future Services Institute staff about key activities undertaken, 
including internal meetings with state program directors and staff, planning for the request 
for proposals, and site visits to select grantees.  Notes from initial meetings of state 
working groups, whole learning network, and staffing meetings were also included to 
provide insight into administrative challenges and resolutions;  the notes represent over 
350 hours spent by numerous research staff from the University on these activities in 2019 
14 
 
and early 2020.  Since the initiative is ongoing, additional field-data from these sources is 
being collected for subsequent analysis.   
Finally, a survey was fielded to all of the local sites that submitted a proposal to the 
state in response to this call for proposals.  Out of 64 applicant organizations, 37 
organizations responded to the survey, representing a 58% response rate. The survey 
included all the applicants, those who did receive and those who didn’t receive five-year 
funding through the initiative to enable us to assess whether or not the state 
disproportionately selected community partners who had positive past interactions with 
them.  Including both survey and interview data from community organizations helps us 
triangulate and explore such patterns.   
Our analytical approach began as merely descriptive, trying to first understand the 
various perspectives in this complex, field-based initiative focused upon advancing more 
racial equity in systems reform.  As we looked across these various forms of data, however, 
we began more focused, inductive analysis to better understand how aspirations and 
actions were aligned.   We introduced all data into Nvivo and embarked upon numerous 
waves of coding, with each investigator reading data and documenting emerging 
understanding of themes and construct relationships in analytical memos.  These memos 
formed the basis of the findings and interpretation that follows, with certain vignettes 






Findings and Analysis 
Gathering around six tables clustered in the light-filled room, about forty-five people 
from Minnesota’s Department of Human Services came together for the day-long planning 
session for the new 2-Generation Policy Network initiative.  Some were apprehensive – 
although most worked for the state, they did not know each other and there was always the 
constant press of email to attend to.  Others were cautiously optimistic – the invitation for 
the day had mentioned leaders’ intentions to work more authentically with BIPOC 
community agencies over the next five-years.  Buzzing with anticipatory energy as people 
got coffee and gathered background documents, the room quieted as three Directors 
stepped to the front of the room.   
Janae, an African American woman, leading one of the largest Divisions in the 
Department with 120 employees, began by stressing the importance of the work bringing 
them together.  While the Department focuses its attention on implementing programs that 
treat parents and children as mere eligibility groups, the real dynamics within families are 
ignored.  The consequences were particularly bleak for people of color.  From her 
experiences, she knew that community-based organizations could address the needs of 
whole families if it weren’t for state and county policy mandates pulling them away.  So the 
state needed to change.  Janae asked: “How can we each connect to that local knowledge?  
How do we engage families more effectively in ways they want to be engaged?  How do we 
put equity into action and tear down institutionalized racism?”  Answering these questions, 
she acknowledged would require a different way of engaging, communicating, and leading 
than what was typically demonstrated by the state agency.  But as she spoke, those 
gathered seemed to come alive with the possibilities.    
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The invitation to change personal practices was echoed by Jerry, a white man, who 
directed the child welfare programs.  He shared his own professional experiences working 
at the frontline lines providing comprehensive preventative services and his frustration 
with how little that reality shaped state administrative practices.  Along with the two 
women beside him, he felt proud to attempt real system systems with this initiative.  
Acknowledging that mistakes would be made, he concluded, “a learning culture is 
imperative” to fuel changes in administrative approaches. The framing of the initiative and 
day’s work continued with Choua, the Director of Child Care services, a Hmong-woman 
who shared her own story.  Her parents had come to this country as refugees and her 
formal education had started in the anti-poverty, federal Head Start program.  After 
finishing college, she worked in early education programs and applied for this state 
leadership role to bring her lived experiences to public administration.  And now, in this 
initiative, she explained that all three Directors were inviting them to consider a powerful 
question: “How do I use this power that I now hold to effect change?”  In her mind, sharing 
power with community-based organizations was critical.  If they did so authentically and 
transparently, this collaboration would impact the state for years to come.   
Attendees later reflected that they had never before heard three senior public 
managers speak with such a unified vision about a collaborative effort.  The day unfolded 
with individuals naming potential tactics – engaging and reporting to the legislature, 
communicating with agencies that had hosted site visits, executing contracts, reducing 
racial disparities – and small groups developing plans to carry them out.  Participating in 
the meeting helped create more optimism about the road head and enabled them to begin 




How did existing legacy public management practices and administrative rules strain 
the building of trust?   
 
As many scholars note (Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Huxham & Vangen, 
2005), collaborative governance initiatives emerge from particular contexts, as groups of 
people seek to develop new ways of addressing pressing problems.  In this empirical case, 
the idea for the collaboration emerged from these public managers who, as suggested by 
this story from the planning retreat, realized they needed to alter state administrative 
practices to invest in whole family programs implemented by community-based 
organizations serving people of color.  The initiative sought to both blend public funding 
and design service programs that engaged whole families, rather than merely 
administering programs consistent with the policy categories of ‘kindergarten ready,’ ‘at 
risk for abuse,’ or ‘work ready’ that appeared in the policy.   
Before attempting this daunting technical feat, the three Directors had to build their 
relationships.  They had worked together for three years and had the clear support of their 
direct supervisor, Niaya the Assistant Commissioner of Children & Families.  Reflecting 
upon the launch of the effort, she noted that initially her overall questions about the project 
were technical, consistent with the norms of the agency:  Can we meet all of the statutory 
requirements?  Can we adjust contracting processes without going to the legislature?  Yet 
as Niaya thought more about it, she realized that it provided an important learning 
opportunity for the agency.  In her mind, it was “like lighting a fire, and watching where it 
was going to catch elsewhere.”    She used her positional authority to become an 
ambassador for the work, including briefing the Governor and Lieutenant Governor about 
the 2-Generation Policy Network.     
18 
 
 With this support, the Directors initiated planning activities which included drafting 
a request for proposals from community-based organizations, developing grant review 
processes, and building internal cross-division workgroups to engage with each local site.  
They also agreed that quarterly meetings with the whole network once the grantees were 
selected would allow insights to be shared and reveal important learning about system 
barriers.  These tactics pushed against the conventional practices within the state agency 
where potential legislative oversight cements a risk-averse administrative climate that 
reinforces program-based structures.  In describing the beginning of the initiative, Jerry 
noted that it was the only time in his seven years in the agency that he had attempted such 
a cross-division collaboration because there was no real infrastructure: “We didn't even 
have the structures or the forums for us to talk to each other and get to know each other.”  
But the potential value of an initiative that focused upon unearthing the knowledge of 
BIPOC community-based organizations to alter state-level administration and policy 
seemed clear.  Yet, each Director needed to take risks.  As Jerry continued:   
“We have not asked people for permission to put this funding together. We did it.  
And there are bodies that I still need to report to that are probably not going to be 
happy about it. But we did it because we felt we had sound justification….We did it 
because we need to try some different things.  It wasn't anything about this agency 
that brought us together. It was us.”   
This commitment to each other was created over time.  When one had sponsored a series 
of listening sessions, the others had shown up.  The conversations they had in the hallways 
about their commitments to racial equity and their frustrations with the existing system 
built their interpersonal trust.   These interpersonal relationships forged around shared 
commitments to working differently were important to moving forward with the changes 
in administrative practices. 
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For example, the conventional state processes within the Department for issuing 
contracts are incredibly complex and time-intensive.  Strict practices exist for developing 
and issuing requests for proposals, and making funding decisions involve multiple levels of 
internal reviews that often take months to achieve.  This process was made more difficult 
in this case because the funds drew upon three different public sources, each with their 
own specific articulation of the target group and other rules.  Staff held over twenty 
internal meetings with other administrators to get an agreement that the proposal should 
describe BIPOC communities’ needs and capability to respond, rather than the 
conventional description of an intervention design and expected outputs.  In the end, they 
were able to persevere and language in the formal announcement was consistent with their 
vision - a “five-year collaborative learning relationship with the state of Minnesota” to a 
“co-creative process that  will uncover and address the systemic influences of racial, 
geographic and economic inequalities.”  Yet, when staff tried to reduce the amount of 
documentation required from applicants, they were met with resistance; even minor 
adjustments necessitated detailed internal negotiations with contracting staff.  While 
webinars were conventionally used to announce grant opportunities, in this case, staff tried 
to express requirements in terms familiar to community-based organizations rather than 
policy constructs.  In addition, they went above and beyond conventional practices by 
doing outreach to potential grantees through email and social media, trying to reach 
agencies that had never before received a state grant;  in interviews, staff noted they hoped 
this professionalism communicated a transparent and trustworthy process, and signaled 
the intentions of the state to be better partners than they had in the past with organizations 
serving people of color.   
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In addition to the conventional committee review of written proposals, staff also 
planned site visits to applicants receiving the highest scores.  The site visit tactic was seen 
by the Directors as both a means to provide important information to aid decision making 
and a way to begin to establish relationships with the community agencies.  Yet site visits 
were not a practice that had much precedent in the Department.  New assessment tools 
needed to be developed.  The visits needed to be scheduled.  The multi-division staff team 
needed to figure out how to integrate the information gathered at the visits with 
committee’s ratings and Directors needed to negotiate their responsibility and authority 
for final decision making about the grant awards.  Further internal negotiations needed to 
occur over both the contract terms and process so that the initiative adhered to state and 
federal law and communicated the spirit of co-learning.  While staff planned a three-month 
process from request for proposals to awarding of grants, developing these new 
administrative processes took far longer.   Sites were notified of their selection after six 
months, but contracts were not finalized until another three months.  When Department 
staff and Directors reflected upon it later, it seemed like there were few options; these 
barriers to collaboration needed to be confronted and new practices established.   
What happened when these practices and rules were altered? 
These administrative reforms were painful to achieve.  Although Directors were committed 
to this effort, there was always a pull to the programmatic responsibilities within their 
Divisions – implementation of a new child welfare federal law; developing new technology 
tools to improve reporting among child care providers; new policies to enable faster access 
to food and child care assistance during the  COVID pandemic.  That type of work, seen as 
‘central’ to each division, created a scarcity of time for senior managers to dedicate to the 
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ongoing learning and strategy development at the heart of their vision.  This reality 
sometimes strained the collaborative activities among the three Directors.  As Juliette. the 
project manager for this phase reflected, “First there is their relationship, and from their 
trust a general feeling of good momentum.  [But when there are hang ups], we have to 
revisit why that decision was made.  And make sure that everyone can see where it is going 
before they agree to keep participating.”     
While the Directors could lean into their relationships to propel them through times 
when shared understanding broke down, the staff did not have prior working 
relationships.  And many were not familiar with this way of working.  Juliette continued:   
“We talk about collaboration but I don’t think it is always understood.  Some people [who 
work for DHS] want to know exactly what’s expected of them at any given time.  And 
collaboration requires adaptability and big picture thinking.  And that’s not necessarily the 
strong suite of state government.”  While collaboration was the goal, the cross-division 
initiative required staff to adjust their typical roles and practices in light of this larger ‘big 
picture’ goal.  Most of the tasks of this collaborative initiative – the process of application 
review, providing support for program design in the sites during the first year, even 
convening the network of grantees -- pushed staff to act outside of their traditional roles of 
writing rules and monitoring contracts.  Individually, they needed to overcome their own 
hesitations to act without a clear direction to build authentic relationships with these new 
community partners; while some embraced this new freedom, it caused great anxiety in 
others.   
Yet the Directors’ collaborative vision also caused them to implement other new 
tactics to try to build a different relationship for BIPOC organizations with the state.  For 
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example, they assigned state staff, many who themselves are BIPOC, to work on site teams 
over the full five-year period.  In this way, they wanted to personalize the public 
bureaucracy and assure local agencies that relationship building was not abstract but very 
specific.  They also invested in facilitation and evaluation support from the University to 
assure that collaborative practices would form the cornerstone of the network.  State 
program managers apprenticed with facilitators and designers, learning about new tools 
and building new skills.  They heard stories about historical trauma they had never before – 
the shame American Indian mothers feel when they don’t know about their traditional 
culture, the compliance pressure community organizational felt to adhere to state-
mandated reporting requirements, the frustration community-based organizations feel 
when they don’t know how to affect the levers of ‘the system’ but can only see how its 
under-resourced work focused upon whole families.  University staff coached state 
managers on how to take these lessons and hone their change strategies within the state 
agency.  They also pushed conventional monitoring standards – that often resulted in 
meaningless information being reported – to enable a first-year documentation of learning 
between the sites and state to replace mere bureaucratic accountability.     
Reflecting on the first year of activities, Director Chaoa recognized that this type of 
collaborative, equity work was “intense.”  She explained, “We're tackling really hard issues, 
and are having challenging conversations.  How do we do that and make sure that staff 
don't get burned out? Anytime you do equity work, it's really draining.  How do we identify 
the system change opportunities?” Directors repeatedly communicated to their internal 
teams the reality that providing equitable treatment to overcome the legacies of the past 
required the state to lay down its sole focus on the consistent process to recognize the 
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significance of customized relationships.  They needed to not solely worry about short-
term accountabilities but rather focus on longer-term outcomes.   
While the existing administrative constraints could slow forward momentum, Niaya 
the Assistant Commissioner noted, it was important to stay focused on the long-term goal:  
“Even if grantees are disappointed that we don't go live [at the original date], we are 
building a relationship, a trusting relationship where we are being transparent.  We 
say ‘here's what we're trying to do, we don't know if it's going to be perfect this time 
around, but we're doing our best.’  We ask them, ‘tell us how we can do better. Tell 
us what you need. That really is the key to trusting relationships, that you're open. 
It's not that everything goes great. It's that you're honest about what's happening…. 
That’s the kind of relationship infrastructure that we need to be successful in 
certain communities that don't trust the Department of Human Services.”  
 
Following the lead of the Governor, public managers regularly acknowledged that BIPOC 
communities had little reason to trust the existing system.  Yet, in the minds of the three 
Directors and the Assistant Commissioner, this 2-Gen initiative was the government’s 
opportunity to build an alternative ‘relationship infrastructure’ necessary for working with 
communities that have experienced systemic racism.  Niaya concluded, “It’s our job to keep 
showing up at the table and saying, we're here to listen and we'd like to hear from you. If 
they say, we don't want to talk to you. Okay.  But we must continue…We don't get to just 
turn away.” Public managers used their own trusting relationships and administrative 
authority to launch this initiative and begin to create an alternative form of infrastructure 
to work with marginalized communities.   
How did community partners respond initially?    
From the perspective of the community-organizations applying for the funds, most of these 
internal state activities were invisible.  What they could see were timelines and what they 
experienced were delays that came from the state processes.   Some information about the 
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initiative had been shared informally in the six months leading up to the official release of 
the request for proposals, but the release of the request itself was delayed for no clear 
reason.  In our survey of applicants, the vast majority noted that their motivation to apply 
was to address inequities in their communities and further integrate services with other 
local partners.  These motivations helped them to act quickly because, when the request 
was finally released, there were only five weeks to develop proposals.  The directions 
required applicants to allocate staff, document partnerships with other local community 
agencies, and develop a detailed budget.   Detailed documentation, including letters of 
commitment and other government forms, also were required.  According to the grant 
applicant survey, four out of five respondents noted that pulling together the grant took “a 
lot of work;” thirty percent reported they invested more than 40 hours to complete it.  
These administrative delays and subsequent tighter timelines compromised community 
partners’ perceived trustworthiness of the agency.  More than half (54%) of the 
respondents agreed that the time delay in the selection process created a burden for their 
organization's decision-making. The vast majority (73%) also disagreed with the statement 
that they received updates about the selection in a timely manner.  Most respondents did 
not agree that DHS ‘knew what it’s doing’ or ‘has deep knowledge about the problems the 
community is facing’.  Most respondents also did not feel that DHS kept the interest of the 
grantees in mind when making decisions.  Taken together, the survey of grant applicants 
documents that - although they had put in the work to apply for initiative funding - their 
perception was a low level of trustworthiness in the Department of Human Services.  
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Juliette. the project manager for this phase recognized these dynamics and hoped 
that their efforts to be transparent and inspirational through the request for proposal 
process could address these dynamics:  She noted:   
Reverberations from previous relationships [grantees had with the state] 
also play out.  We were working with sites and saying we want something 
different.  And they don’t really believe it.  I don’t blame them.  They’ve had 
relationships with the state before that are very structured, very constrained 
and compliance-driven.  While we are saying we want to try and do 
something different, breaking them out of the habits of interaction with the 
state is challenging.  And sometimes we aren’t always able to carry through 
on wanting to be flexible and adaptable.   And collaboration suffers because 
of that.”   
The work of overcoming the legacy of the past was very much present in the first 
months of launching this initiative.   
 Our in-depth interviews with the grantees further elaborated on these initial 
conditions.  Some grantees held a favorable assessment of the state and emphasized the 
genuine efforts shown and interpersonal relationships built during the selection process. 
When asked about early experiences, a project manager in a nonprofit organization serving 
refugees and immigrants since the 1980s said: “I saw people in the state are coming 
together and working to help make this place a better place…. They are good people. They 
want to see Minnesota and its citizens and constituents prosper and I think that was the 
biggest takeaway.” Even one leader who expressed a high level of distrust towards the 
agency due to past experiences noted that she appreciated how the state Directors had 
come together: “I learned…there are three separate very large governmental agencies that 
are really actively putting their money where their mouth is and coming together as a 
group to offer opportunities.  That was surprising to me.”   
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               Despite the general appreciation of the interpersonal interactions with the 
directors and DHS staff, more grantees offered a more conservative assessment of the 
trustworthiness of the state government.  While there might be a personal connection with 
these particular directors, they were only individual people.  One nonprofit manager in an 
emergency shelter serving families experiencing homelessness said it succinctly: 
“Individuals may desire change, but they are part of a larger structure and system and are 
trying to fight its inertia.”  As Juliette had worried, most reflected upon past experiences of 
working with the state, where the existing bureaucratic structure inhibited effective 
relationships and service arrangements.  They also noted what seemed like inherent 
disconnects between the DHS leadership and the community; when push came to shove, 
the state would prioritize their processes over the community needs.  As one agency leader 
reflected, “It never occurred to me that (the state should keep our organization’s interest in 
mind).  Is that something that they are supposed to do?”  
For community-based organizations, was trust built over time?  
Attempting to overcome this legacy and bring the idea of a ‘learning network’ into 
practice, the initiative included quarterly meetings with all eight grantee organizations, 
Directors and state staff on site and evaluation teams.   At the first meeting, the Directors 
launched the session sharing their own stories and vision, much as they had in the internal 
staff retreat nearly four months earlier.  To have real partners in the work, they pledged to 
“create a new infrastructure” and help the local partners to “design structures to meet 
family needs” that address negative outcomes for BIPOC families interacting with the 
system.  Noting the support of others, including the Governor and his Children's Cabinet, 
they stressed their commitment to mutual learning.   They recognized that communities 
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often have solutions and they hoped that “each would work to identify what each of us can 
do” to carry the lessons into systems change.   
Each of the whole network meetings was carried out with very participatory 
processes focused on giving people experiences in co-learning.  At the first meeting, for 
example, people were asked to do speed dating to described work, and what they each did 
to center the lived experience of families into policy and program design/delivery.  At the 
second, they used a peer learning process where people named discussion topics of most 
burning interest to them:  a tactic to develop a 'master leasing' strategy to help families 
access housing;  techniques for engaging their own local core team of stakeholders or 
families to help in first year's work of program design; discussions to probe assumptions 
about families underlying program designs.  The facilitation team was made up of people of 
diverse races and each important conversation of the whole group was graphically 
recorded.  As the meetings unfolded, beautiful visual art documented shared learning.  In 
one, a wall-size poster had images  of some of the leaders and a ribbon running through it 
on which was written the purpose of the gathering: “laying the foundation, sharing our 
dreams, building trust, sharing cultural healing, systems change, healing intergenerational 
trauma."  The colorful poster was a concrete artifact of the diversity in the room.  After each 
meeting, the facilitation team created a short, newsletter with photographs and key 
documents from the day-long session.     
We interviewed community partners after the first two meetings.  In general, all the 
community partners appreciated the interpersonal interactions with the Department 
Directors, staff, and other community-based organizations.   The participatory activities 
built interpersonal trust and informants shared their growing confidence that the DHS was 
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genuine in carrying out this system-based reform.  As a leader of an organization with 
expertise serving refugees noted:  "The flexibility...shows me that the state is really 
invested in this, that they're really listening, and that they want to try something that hasn't 
been tried before."  He goes on to say, "It is evident when you interact with them.  And 
when you go to the next meeting, you will see that as well…. It's just so blatantly obvious 
because of the way that they act."   The very structure of the participatory network helped 
convince these organizations that these Directors and program leaders knew the systemic 
challenges that hurt BIPOC.  The leaders from the refugee service organization concluded:  
"If they didn't know...they wouldn't be doing this kind of work. The fact that they are doing 
this kind of approach shows me that they understand that there is something that needs to 
be better."   
These day-long whole network meetings began to create an expectation of co-
learning with the state that served as a practical, collaborative foundation when the COVID-
19 pandemic hit during the first year.  When the large group gathered virtually, they were 
able to benefit from small group conversations with people in other roles across the state.  
Nonprofit program managers, state staff, DHS Directors, frontline case managers shared 
information about their organizational response to the pandemic and social uprisings as 
Minnesota responded to the murder of George Floyd by the hands of police.  They 
recognized common challenges - how could they create better processes for providing food, 
housing, and access to services to those in need?  how could they make sense of the racial 
inequity in how the pandemic was affecting their local community?  how could they use 
flexible funding to respond to some of these needs?  The information shared was specific 
and tactical; people felt comfortable in authentically engaging with each other and sharing 
29 
 
their emerging understanding.  As one staff member who had worked for DHS for more 
than thirty-years reflected, "I have never seen the state work so fast to meet the needs of 
people."      
Thus, while the first year of activities in the Minnesota 2-Gen Policy Network was 
unprecedented, there were some glimmers that the tactics undertaken by public managers 
had begun to create a different type of infrastructure in working with these few 
community-based organizations.  The events during summer 2020, however, brought into 
the spotlight the massive amount of work that lies ahead for public managers to redesign 
administrative practices and processes to assure community-based organizations of the 
state’s trustworthiness.      
 
Interpretation 
Our data from the early development of the Minnesota 2-Generation Policy Network 
documents how leaders in the state agency gradually built trust through altering existing 
public management routines and structures.  They began within the public bureaucracy 
before starting to work with community-based organizations serving BIPOC families.  
Figure One illustrates the tactics described in the findings section, illustrating what 
happened and what resulted in this case.  Given the historical power disparities and legacy 
of distrust, the narrative reveals how the process of transforming the existing contracting 
regime that cements institutional racism to the collaborative governance regime that tries 
to undo it is not easy and automatic. In fact, our analysis reveals that trust operates as a 
critical resource due.  Figure Two summarizes the tactics carried out in this case, as the 
government tried to build trust with BIPOC community-based organizations and what 
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resulted.   In both Figures, a trust building tactic cascaded with another, each needing to 
occur before the next right action could be undertaken.  The process could not be predicted 
but needed to emerge as leaders and staff observed what happened from their initial 
actions in the complex, social system (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Sandfort & Moulton, 
2010)  
Trust both empowers existing organizational routines and creates new 
organizational routines.  It helps both consolidate and share power.  In fact, our analysis 
suggests that the interactions among organizational routines, trust, and power are key to 
understanding how genuine administrative reforms focused upon addressing systematical 
inequities take place on the ground.  
[Insert Figures One and Two about here] 
Trust, organizational routines, and bureaucratic change 
Consistent with the metaphor of “networking in the shadow of bureaucracy” (McGuire & 
Agranoff, 2010), our analysis of this case reveals that administrative reform toward 
collaborative governance takes place in the web of existing hierarchies, structures, and 
routines.  Throughout this administrative reform process, directors and project leaders 
repeatedly noted they were pushing against a rigid administrative apparatus.  Although 
Directors were committed to this vision, staff working under them hesitated to deviate 
from conventional routines, to grapple with ambiguity and act anyway.  Each step in the 
process to establish this collaborative governance initiative required persistent, and what 
often felt like courageous actions, from those with formal authority and those who worked 
for them.  
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Many routine decisions face public managers: How to structure a meeting?  Who is 
invited?  How to leverage the tools of the public bureaucracy - contracting, reporting – in 
ways consistent with the trust-building aim?  While these decisions often seem mundane or 
insignificant, each provides an opportunity to build or deplete the overall stock of trust in 
the initiative.  They become tangible ways that community-based organizations service 
BIPOC can observe and experience in daily interactions with the state.  They constitute a 
relationship infrastructure.   
As Agranoff (2014) argued, the authority of hierarchical roles remains important in 
service networks and collaborative initiatives.  In this case, while Directors used their 
authority to refocus public funds from state and national sources, it was also important to 
convene the staff and share their imperative to be responsive. Until they stood in front of 
their staff and shared their vision, skepticism about the intent of the initiative prevailed. In 
other words, the Directors’ interpersonal relationships and trust building – alignment of 
core commitment, living experiences and background – allowed them to coordinate their 
administrative authority.  This enabled them to secure sponsorship from the Assistant 
Commissioner and Governor, which ultimately enables them to activate and champion the 
whole administrative reform process (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2015).   Trust building with 
the Assistant Commissioner, among the Directors themselves, and in their divisions created 
power for them to make existing organizational routines a site of innovation and 
organizational change (Feldman, 2000). To enable funding for the collaborative initiative, 
Directors took a broader interpretation of the legislative intent of their particular 
programs.  Their subsequent activities gave new meaning and purpose to what initially 
appeared to be rigid organizational routines of planning meetings, disseminating grant 
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requests, and signing contracts. Reflecting the framework Feldman and Rafaeli (2002) 
describe, the new activities enabled public managers and staff to build new connections 
and shared understandings, thus activating the administrative reform from within.   
               As new organizational routines were created, the trust-building cycle continued to 
evolve and facilitate more durable administrative reform. New techniques for the webinars, 
practices to communicate more openly with applicants and selected grantees, gatherings 
where state and community-based organizations could learn together - these new 
organizational practices created opportunities to build trust both between the government 
and community-based organizations, and among community-based organizations 
themselves.  They also provide new resources and an institutional foundation for 
accountability. Trust does not replace structures and routines. Instead, these two forces 
strengthen and reinforce each other (Braithwaite,1998; Sandfort & Moulton, 2020).  These 
institutional innovations, combined with the interpersonal trust built in these processes, 
create a sufficient level of institutional trust towards the government for BIPOC 
community-based organizations that allowed them to participate in this administrative 
reform. In turn, BIPOC community-based organizations’ participation in this reform further 
enabled the trust-building loop to operate between the government and these 
organizations. 
Trust and power in the administrative reform process 
In most public human service bureaucracies, each division has an independent relationship 
with community-based organizations based on the form and content of the contracts they 
issue. This fragmented power makes it difficult to initiate and implement system-oriented 
changes to address institutional racism. As the theory of change documents developed at 
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the start of this project noted, “The current system is transactional rather than adaptive, 
transformative, and innovative."  In this initiative, led predominantly by BIPOC public 
managers, their collaborative vision was particularly audacious, an attempt to develop 
authentic collaboration with organizations serving people historically under-served and 
ineffectively served.  To deliver this vision, they needed to intentionally build trust among 
themselves and with BIPOC community-based organizations, consolidating power that was 
initially fragmented within public bureaucracies and across BIPOC communities. Figure 
Three illustrates how trust building among the DHS Directors and between the government 
and BIPOC community-based organizations gradually consolidated power and enabled 
them to begin to collectively address racial inequities in human services.  In our inductive 
data analysis, we particularly noticed three stages of trust building, documenting how each 
build power and resources for the subsequent actions to take place: trust building among 
Director, trust building between the government and potential grant applicants, and trust 
building between the government and BIPOC community-based organizations.  
[Insert Figure Three about here] 
Trust-building, power-sharing, and power-consolidation occur at and across different 
levels of collaboration in this administrative reform.  In this case, the three Directors 
developed the collaboration within the bureaucracy to consolidate more power, which was 
necessary to destabilize some of the existing agency routines around requesting proposals 
and site visits.  As leaders in BIPOC community-based organizations and public managers 
build more trust, they collectively built and shared more power and resources for the 
collaborative to address the systematic racial disparities in the community (Feldman, 2004; 
Feldman & Quick, 2009).  This power was crucial to give them a chance at the work ahead - 
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making concrete changes in public policy and public investments to support programming 
focused upon whole families.  Yet it is important to note -- power was created and 
consolidated first before it could be shared.   As more trust was built, more power was built 
with the BIPOC community.  
 
Conclusion 
With the social inequities made more salient in the stressors of the COVID-19 era, 
addressing institutional racism embedded in the existing public management practices 
should become a top priority for public managers. Our study improves understanding of 
how trust can be built between government and BIPOC community-based organizations 
when distrust from years of normative routines dominates these relationships.   Our 
analysis highlights that, at the beginning of the administrative reform, there are complex 
interdependences among personal identities, organizational routines, interpersonal trust, 
institutional trust, and power.  In the previous literature, it is assumed that trust is easier to 
build when power is shared (Farrell,2004; Ran & Qi, 2019).  It is also and that trust building 
takes place between two organizations or individuals (Vangen & Huxham, 2003).  Our 
findings suggest a more complex trust-building cycle where trust does not only operate 
between two organizations or two individuals.  Instead, trust must be built at and across 
different levels of collaboration.  Power, too, was consolidated throughout trust-building 
processes allowing them to challenge routines that operate as mechanisms of institutional 
racism and create new routines that facilitate more power sharing with BIPOC community-
based organizations.   
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  To begin to address institutionalized racism, public managers need to be intentional 
about the legacy preceding them.  They also must recognize the significance of their own 
identities in assessing and challenging traditional forms of authority in the bureaucracy.  
That awareness must be followed with careful consideration of strategies and tactics that 
build collaborative activities that challenge existing routines within and between 
organizations to continuously build and reinforce trust.  It is the old adage of ‘walking the 
talk.’   These purposive actions are important ways to communicate with historically 
marginalized communities and help convince them that trust is appropriate.  Trust is not 
automatically generated; it needs to be earned.   
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Figure 3.  How Trust Helps Consolidate Power in Each Stage of the Administrative Reform. 
 
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate that power is fragmented among actors. Solid lines indicate that power is consolidated among actors.  
 refers to the three DHS Directors.  refers to potential 2-gen grant applicants.  refers to the BIPOC community-based organization 
grantees. The circles around those actors refer to their divisions (in the case of the Directors) and their local networks (in the case of 
BIPOC community-based organizations).  
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Appendix 1.  Local Sites Participating in Minnesota’s 2-Generation Policy Network 2nd Cohort:/Whole Families System Initiative. 
Source:  Adapted from Sandfort, Sarode & Hendriks (2020).   
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